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Key proxy for third-party keys

Store an API key for a third-party provider (Cloudflare, Tailscale, Stripe, and others) and agents in your chats can use it without ever seeing the real value. Only a placeholder reaches an agent; the real key stays in a separate, dedicated key service and is swapped in only on the way out to the provider.

Isometric drawing of a key service. Envelopes carrying a hollow placeholder ring travel along a conveyor. A swap head replaces the ring with a glowing real key just before the provider's door, and swaps it back on the return belt.
Click or press Enter to send a request or approve a paymentdemo tape: 12 requests · 9 passed · 3 refused · 3 approved by you · real keys seen by the agent 0
The workspace only ever holds the hollow ring. The key service swaps in the real key on the last stretch and swaps it back in the response. The 12-request tape is a demo, not live traffic.
Figure as text
  1. The agent in your workspace sends a request. Where the key belongs, it carries a placeholder: a hollow ring.
  2. The egress broker stamps the request with the user and container it came from.
  3. At the key service, the destination host picks the provider's profile, and the drawer for that profile opens.
  4. A request the key's rule does not allow is pushed onto the return belt. The agent gets a 403.
  5. Payments and unknown operations wait under the lamp until you approve them with the lever. Without an answer they end as a 403. In the demo, the lever pulls itself after a moment.
  6. For allowed requests, a head swaps the placeholder for the real key. The request goes only to that provider's door.
  7. The response returns on the second belt. A second head swaps any key value in it for a placeholder before it reaches the agent.
  8. Three gauges count refused requests, requests that reached the provider, and payments you approved. The readout also counts real keys the agent has seen. It stays at 0.
One request through the key proxyAn agent sends a request that carries a placeholder instead of your key. The egress broker hands it to the key service with a signed preamble naming the user and container. The key service rejects ambiguous requests, chooses the provider profile by destination host, checks that the placeholder is yours, classifies the operation and compares it with the key's rule. Allowed operations continue; known but disallowed ones get 403; unknown operations and payments wait for your approval. After a rate brake the real key is inserted and sent only to the profile's host, and the response is redacted before it returns to the agent.Key service (separate VM)allowedneeds younot allowedapproved once1. Agent sends a requestwith a placeholderinstead of the key2. Egress broker handsover with a signedpreamble (user, container)3. Reject ambiguousrequests: path tricks,duplicate headers4. Pick the profile byhost. Placeholder mustbe yours, same container5. Classify the operation,check the key's rule6. Rate brakeper risk class7. Insert the real key9. Redact your key values,swap new secrets forplaceholders, send back403 refusedYou approve unknownoperations, payments(60 s, then 403)8. Provider APIprofile host onlyno redirects
The agent only ever holds a placeholder; the real key is inserted by the key service on the last hop to the provider.
Diagram as text
  1. The agent in your workspace sends its request to the egress broker. Where the key belongs, it carries a placeholder.
  2. The broker hands the request to the key service with a preamble, signed with a shared secret, that names the user and the container. A preamble outside a 30 second window, or with a wrong signature, is refused.
  3. The key service rejects ambiguous requests: path tricks, method overrides, duplicate headers.
  4. It picks the provider profile from the destination host, not from anything the caller says.
  5. The placeholder must belong to you, to this profile and to this container.
  6. It classifies the operation by method and path and checks it, and the resources in the path and body, against the rule on your key.
  7. Allowed operations continue. Known but disallowed operations get a 403. Unknown operations, and payments unless the key has full access, wait for your approval, held for 60 seconds by default. Without an answer the caller gets a 403 and a retry asks again.
  8. A rate brake per risk class is applied.
  9. The key service inserts the real key and sends the request only to the profile's host. It never follows redirects.
  10. In the response it redacts your key values (plain, base64, hex, URL-encoded) and swaps any new secret the provider returns for a fresh placeholder, then passes the response back to the agent.

What to know

Plain-language overview: API key proxy for AI agents.

Each vault entry can also be set to use only: the AI sees a placeholder with an ID, and the key service inserts the value only for hosts you allow, now also for Postgres and MySQL. See the vault for the three states, the passkey confirmation and the path from box through broker and key service to the target, and blackout for how values are removed from tool output and provider requests.

Finding a provider

Open Settings, then Providers & keys. The page has two tabs: AI providers for your own AI key (see your own API key) and Services & keys, which is this key proxy. Each tab has its own address, ?tab=ki and ?tab=dienste.

Microsoft 365

The Microsoft 365 (Graph) template covers the directory, mail, calendar, files, SharePoint pages and the list of Teams channels. The app signs in with client credentials: you enter the tenant ID or domain, the client ID and either a certificate (recommended) or a client secret. The key service trades them for short-lived Graph tokens by itself and talks only to graph.microsoft.com. The agent sees neither the secret nor the token.

What a hidden key does not prove

A placeholder prevents the supported agent route from returning the credential itself. Destination, method and path policies decide which operations are allowed. An allowed operation can still have harmful effects; narrow the provider permissions as well as the proxy policy. This is not protection against every compromise of the application or host. See the request boundary and the separate vault.

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